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IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IMMORAL EVEN IF IT DOES DETER MURDER?
Thomas Kleven
After years of inconclusive debate, recent studies purport
to demonstrate that capital punishment does indeed deter
murder, perhaps to the tune of multiple saved lives for each
person executed. In response to these studies, Professors
Sunstein and Vermeule have argued that since capital
punishment leads to a net savings of innocent lives, it may
be morally required on consequentialist grounds. I argue,
even assuming the validity of the studies, that capital
punishment cannot be justified in the United States in the
current historical context for reasons of justice that trump
consequentialist considerations. Mine is not an argument
that capital punishment is absolutely immoral, since in a
sufficiently just society I think it can be justified, at
least in some instances. Rather the point is, first, that
the consequentialist argument countenances the execution of
those who due to diminished mental capacity are not
sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the death penalty, in
particular children and the mentally impaired; and, second,
that since social injustices contribute to murder,
particularly among the impoverished and disadvantaged, that
substantial societal reform must be undertaken before
capital punishment could be considered justifiable. At that
point it is an open question whether capital punishment
would even be needed as a deterrent to murder.
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After years of inconclusive debate, recent studies
purport to demonstrate that capital punishment does indeed
deter murder,1 perhaps to the tune of multiple saved lives
for each person executed.2

The basic thrust of the findings

appears to be that, while at low levels of execution there
is no deterrent effect and even a brutalizing effect that
increases murder, beyond some threshold level of executions
capital punishment is an effective deterrent, that the
impact is greater the swifter the punishment is imposed, and
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that by and large it works to deter all types of murder and
among both whites and blacks.
In response to these studies, Professors Sunstein and
Vermeule have argued that since capital punishment leads to
a net savings of innocent lives, it may be morally required
on consequentialist grounds.3

There is currently a heated

public debate over capital punishment, with some proposing
its abolition and others pushing to increase its use.4

If

these studies and arguments such as Sunstein’s and
Vermeules’s are found persuasive, they may help sway the
debate and could contribute to a dramatic increase in the
number of executions.5
3

Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. ___
(2005).
4
On the one hand, for example, we have the Governor of Illinois
imposing a moratorium on death sentences per doubts about the fairness
of the defendants’ trials. Dirk Johnson, “Illinois, Citing Faulty
Verdicts Bars Executions,” New York Times, Feb. 1, 2000. On the other
hand, we have Massachusetts and New York considering reinstating capital
punishment, and proposals in Congress to speed up the execution process
by limiting appeals to federal courts. Pam Belluck, “Massachusetts
Governor Urges Death Penalty,” New York Times, Apr. 29, 2005; Al Baker,
“Republicans Seek a Bipartisan Vote on a Bill to Reinstate the State’s
Death Penalty,” New York Times, Mar. 3, 2005; “Republicans want to speed
up death penalty,” Reuters News Service, July 6, 2005.
5
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. (1972), the Supreme Court imposed a
moratorium on capital punishment pending what it perceived to be needed
procedural reform. As states began to reform their laws, the Court
sanctioned the resumption of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia
(1976) and companion cases. Between 1976 and 2003 there were 885
executions, and as of the end of 2003 there were 3,374 persons under
sentence of death. Thomas B. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, “Capital
Punishment, 2003,” Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 5, 10, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf. Between 1976 and 2002,
there were 544,885 homicides. After remaining fairly constant over most
of that period the homicide rate dropped significantly in the late 1990s
and early 2000s; between 1999-2002 there were an average of 15,837
homicides per year. James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, “Homicide
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I shall argue here, even assuming the validity of the
studies,6 that capital punishment cannot be justified in the
United States in the current historical context for reasons
of justice that trump consequentialist considerations.

Mine

is not an argument that capital punishment is absolutely
immoral, since in a sufficiently just society I think it can
be justified.

Rather the point is that the United States is

not that society, that capital punishment threatens to
perpetuate the society’s present injustices, and that
substantial societal reform must first be undertaken before
capital punishment could be considered justifiable.

At that

point it is an open question whether capital punishment
would even be needed as a deterrent to murder.

Trends in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm. Given these
numbers, a sharp increase in the use of capital punishment could easily
produce many thousands of executions.
6
All the studies appear to be rigorous multi-variable regression
analyses. As such, they may well influence the public debate over
whether and how extensively capital punishment should be practiced. If
the studies are accurate, an increase in executions might save even more
lives. But as with all scientific analyses of causal relations, the
validity of the methodology will always be open to question. See, e.g.,
Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Deja
Vu All Over Again? 2 J. EMP. L. STUD. 303 (2005) (criticizing the recent
studies’ methodology and conclusions, in particular the Mocan & Gittings
study). In addition, as with the studies purporting to show no
deterrent effect, supra note 1, there will always be some uncertainty as
to the existence and extent of the causal connection between capital
punishment and the murder rate. There is no uncertainty, however, about
what will happen if the pro-deterrence studies contribute to the current
push in this society for more and swifter executions. If that comes
about, thousands more people are likely to be executed. It is
imperative, therefore, that these studies be subjected to extensive
critical inquiry. Beyond that, even if the studies are accurate, it is
equally important to debate their policy and moral significance.
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Part A of the paper details Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s
thesis and sets forth points of agreement.

In particular, I

agree that consequentialist or utilitarian considerations
have a prominent place in a just society, and that any
society must make decisions that trade off life against
life.

That is why capital punishment cannot be ruled out as

an abstract proposition under any and all social conditions.
Part B addresses the question of blameworthiness,
focusing specifically on juveniles and the mentally
impaired.

Since they oppose the execution of innocent

people even if that would deter murder, Sunstein’s and
Vermeule’s consequentialist case for capital punishment
assumes that it is only justifiable to execute those who are
morally responsible for their acts.

Yet they seem to

support on deterrence grounds the execution of juveniles and
the mentally impaired, implying that they view them as
morally responsible for the murders they commit.

Part B

discusses objections to executing juveniles and the mentally
impaired, on grounds that they are not sufficiently
blameworthy to justify the ultimate punishment, and
concludes that these objections have merit.
Part C addresses the issue of social injustice as a
cause contributing to murder.

I argue that the

consequentialist justification for capital punishment is
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morally permissible only under conditions of substantial
social justice, and that those conditions do not now pertain
in the United States, in particular as to the disadvantaged
segments of society among whom murder is most common.

Part

D briefly concludes.
A.

The Consequentialist Argument
In light of evidence purporting to show that capital

punishment deters murder, Sunstein and Vermeule argue from a
consequentialist or utilitarian perspective that society may
have a moral obligation to employ it.

The logic of the

argument, as I understand it, proceeds as follows:
a.

No valid distinction exists between government action
and inaction, such that government’s failure to act
to save lives is the moral equivalent of its
affirmatively taking life.

b.

Absent countervailing considerations, of which the
action/non-action distinction does not consist,
government ought to act so as to preserve life.

c.

When faced with life-life trade-offs, i.e., when
lives will be lost whether the government chooses to
act or not to act, it ought (i.e., is morally
obligated) to choose to maximize life.

d.

To the extent capital punishment deters more murders
than those executed for committing murder, and to the
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extent that other less drastic means to accomplish
the same end are unavailable, it maximizes life and
therefore should be practiced.
In this section I discuss areas of agreement with the
argument, and in subsequent sections areas of disagreement.
First, I agree that there is no valid moral distinction
between government action and inaction.

Therefore, for the

government to allow someone to die when it could take steps
to prevent it is comparable from a moral perspective to the
affirmative taking of someone’s life.

Therefore, the

argument that it is absolutely immoral for the government to
execute someone for murder is incoherent when doing so
deters murder, because under those circumstances it would be
equally immoral not to execute murderers so as to prevent
murder.

Therefore, moral considerations other than the

act/non-act distinction must be employed to resolve the
question of whether to engage in capital punishment.
The reason why government action and inaction are
morally equivalent is two-fold.

First, at least when the

government is capable of acting and has knowledge of the
consequences of its choice to act or not, the choice not to
act is in itself an action.

This makes the act/non-act

distinction logically and morally incoherent.

Second, the

very purpose of government is to promote society’s welfare.

7

While varying moral perspectives are possible as regards
what society may or may not do, or must or must not do, in
promoting welfare, given the incoherence of the act/non-act
distinction it seems unlikely that any of the political
philosophies that undergird this society would absolutely
ban capital punishment.
Utilitarianism certainly wouldn’t support an absolute
ban because by definition it requires government to maximize
society’s welfare,7 and if practicing capital punishment
would do so then that’s what should be done.

This is

essentially Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s argument.

Nor would

libertarianism support an absolute ban because by definition
it requires government to protect people’s right to live as
they see fit so long as they don’t interfere with others’
commensurate right,8 and if executing murderers would help
promote people’s right not to be murdered then that’s what
should be done.9

Nor would Rawlsian egalitarianism support

7

See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the theory of rational
behavior, in AMARTYA SEN & BERNARD WILLIAMS, EDS., UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39
(1982); Henry R. West, Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility in HARLAN
B. MILLER & WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, EDS., THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 23 (1982).
8
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
9
Some libertarians view the right to life as inalienable, and argue
that capital punishment violates the murderer’s right to life despite
the murderer’s having violated the victim’s right. See, e.g., George H.
Smith, A Killer’s Right to Life, 10 LIBERTY 46 (1996). Others view
murderers as having forfeited the right to assert their own right to
life, and support capital punishment as justifiable retribution for
violating the victim’s right to life or per society’s interest in
promoting the libertarian principle of non-aggression against others.
See, e.g., N. Stephan Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and
Rights, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 609 (1997); J. Charles King, A Rationale
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an absolute ban because its first principle requires that
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others,”10 one of which basic liberties would have to be the
right not to deprived of life without just cause, and if
executing murderers would deter violations of that right
then that’s what should be done.11
for Punishment, 4 JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 151 (1980). Libertarians
tend to favor retributive and restitutive theories of punishment, and to
oppose punishment for the sake of deterring others. See, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the
Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 166 (1996)(“Criminal law
only incidentally concerns the use of punishment to deter others from
committing crimes in the future”). The objection to deterrence as a
justification flows from libertarianism’s commitment to the principle
that no one may be compelled to serve the interests of others against
their will. See NOZICK, supra note 8, at ix, 33-34. But where there are
harms (like murder) for which restitution is impossible and no
compensation is adequate, society as a whole has a legitimate interest
in preventing those harms. Therefore, deterrence seems consistent with
libertarian principles, so long as sanctions are imposed on those who
because of their acts deserve to be punished and not on innocent people.
See, e.g., King, supra at 158 (“[E]veryone...has reason to wish to see a
practice followed that will raise the cost of violating the principles
of right and thereby discourage people from doing so...A chief point of
the whole practice is to deter, but the practice does not thereby allow
punishing those who have committed no offense.”).
10
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971).
11
Rawls does not develop a full theory of punishment and does not
directly discuss capital punishment. He does say that “the purpose of
the criminal law is to uphold basic natural duties, those which forbid
us to injure other persons in their life and limb, or to deprive them of
their liberty and property, and punishments are to serve this end.”
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 314. And that “(h)aving agreed to these
principles [of justice] in view of the reasons already surveyed, it is
rational to authorize the measures needed to maintain just institutions,
assuming that the constraints of equal liberty and the rule of law are
duly recognized.” Id. at 576. To me this suggests that it might well
be justifiable in a generally just society to execute those who
intentionally and unjustifiably deprive others of their lives and who
are mentally competent enough to be deemed blameworthy for their acts;
but if, and only if, it can adequately be shown that capital punishment
deters murder more so than other measures that don’t deprive the
murderer of his own life. Otherwise it would not be “needed to maintain
just institutions.” In other contexts, however, capital punishment
seems more problematic. For example, it would seem unjustifiable to
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This does not yet mean that utilitarianism,
libertarianism and egalitarianism would require capital
punishment, but only that they would not absolutely ban it.
In fact, in some instances all three approaches would
counsel against capital punishment and require that it not
be employed.

Suppose, for example, that practicing capital

punishment would produce more rather than less murders.
Then practicing it would violate utilitarianism by
detracting from rather than promoting society’s welfare,
would violate libertarianism since government would then be
contributing to rather than protecting against the violation
of people’s libertarian rights, and would violate
egalitarianism by undermining the right not to be deprived
of life without just cause.
That moral thinking neither absolutely bans nor
absolutely requires capital punishment, but rather sometimes
supports and sometimes counsels against it depending on the
circumstances, is what leads Sunstein and Vermeule to
conclude that an empirical analysis of the actual impact of
capital punishment is necessary to the moral decision of

execute thieves, even if execution were the most effective deterrent,
because the punishment imposed on the thief is disproportionate to the
injustice that thievery entails. And it would seem unjustifiable to
execute those subjected to social injustices that causally contribute to
the murders they commit, since then capital punishment would be helping
to maintain unjust institutions.
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whether to practice it.

I agree with their argument up to

this point, that is, I agree that capital punishment can at
times be justified on moral grounds.

However, for reasons

to be developed below I do not think that capital punishment
can be justified in this society at this historical
juncture, whereas I take Sunstein and Vermeule to argue that
it can be.
A second area of agreement is with the notions that
absent countervailing considerations society ought to act so
as to preserve life, that in so doing government will often
have to make life against life trade-offs, and that in
making such decisions the goal should be to maximize life.
That society should preserve life, and a goal of preserving
more rather than less life, follows from all the
philosophies discussed above.

And that life-life trade-offs

unavoidably impact many if not most government decisions –
capital punishment, going to war, environmental regulation,
social welfare benefits, constructing highways, and many
more – is apparent.

However, countervailing moral

considerations may at times compete with the
consequentialist argument for capital punishment, and in my
judgment Sunstein and Vermeule do not give adequate play to
such considerations, in particular to the related issues of
murderers’ blameworthiness for their acts and of the impact
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of social injustices in contributing to murder.

The next

two parts address these considerations.
B.

The Question of Blameworthiness – Executing Juveniles
and the Mentally Impaired
Sunstein and Vermeule limit their analysis to the

consequentialist goal of preventing murder.

This

intentionally avoids the question of whether capital
punishment is morally justifiable or required for
retributive reasons irrespective of its deterrent effect.12
Consequently, they do not address the question of a
murderer’s blameworthiness for the act of committing murder.
While blameworthiness is an essential and sticky component
of a retributive justification for capital punishment, I
also think it relevant to and problematic for a
consequentialist rationale.

This is especially so with

regard to juveniles and the mentally impaired in light of
Supreme Court decisions banning their execution on moral
grounds,13 strong public sentiments opposed to executing

12

For retributive arguments in favor of capital punishment, see, e.g.,
Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in HUGO ADAM BEDAU & PAUL
G. CASSELL, EDS., DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 183, 197 (2004)(“Capital
punishment’s retributive function vindicates the fundamental moral
principles that a criminal should receive his just deserts. Even if
capital punishment had no incapacitative or deterrent utility, its use
would be justified on this basis alone.”); Louis P. Pojman, Why the
Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible, id., at 51, 56 (“Intentionally
taking the life of an innocent human being is so evil that absent
mitigating circumstances, the perpetrator forfeits his own right to
life. He or she deserves to die.”).
13
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 318 (2002)(banning the
execution of the mentally retarded as cruel and unusual punishment on
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them,14 and the large numbers likely to be executed if the
consequentialist argument holds sway.15

the grounds that “today our society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal”; and that:
“Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right
and wrong and are competent to stand trial... Their deficiencies do not
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their
personal culpability.”); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1196
(2005)(banning the execution of juveniles under 18 at the time of the
offense: “Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with
an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)(banning the
execution of the insane: “For today, no less than before, we may
seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has
no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his
fundamental right to life... Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized
societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with
his own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the intuition
that such an execution simply offends humanity is evidently shared
across this Nation. Faced with such widespread evidence of a
restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is compelled to conclude
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence
of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect
the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting
mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth
Amendment.”). Admittedly these points are debatable, as evidenced by
the closeness of the cases, with Roper and Ford being 5-4 decisions and
Atkins 6-3. The point is that without that debate advocating the
execution of juveniles and the mentally impaired on consequentialist
grounds is incomplete.
14
In a 2003 Gallup poll 75% of the respondents opposed the death
penalty for the mentally ill, 82% for the mentally retarded, and 69% for
juveniles. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t251.pdf.
15
As of year end 2003, 67 (representing 2% of the total) of prisoners
under sentence of death were under 18 years of age at the time of
arrest; 341 (or 11% of the total) were between 18-19; and 843 (or 27% of
the total) were between 20-24. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5, Table 7,
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf. Between 1976 and
2002, 66,764 homicide offenders (representing 11% of the total
offenders) were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense; another
218,648 homicide offenders (representing 36% of the total) were between
18-24. Fox & Zawitz, supra note 5, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
homicide/tables/oagetab.htm. Given these numbers, widespread use of
capital punishment against juvenile and other youthful offenders would
produce hundreds if not thousands of executions.
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Although they do not discuss the issue of
blameworthiness, Sunstein and Vermeule seem aware of it when
they attempt to skirt, unsuccessfully I think, the question
of whether their analysis would also justify executing
innocent people if that would on balance save yet more
innocent lives through its deterrent impact on murder.

Thus

they say, though without explaining why, that “[o]f course
it is prima facie objectionable, worse than outrageous, if
the state proposes to kill people whom it knows to be
innocent.”16

But why should that be so if it would deter

the murder of even more people?

For example, to the extent

that potential murderers value their loved ones’ lives more
than their own, an entirely plausible assumption in many
instances, then executing murders’ loved ones might well
deter more murders than would executing the murderers
themselves.

If that seems objectionable on moral grounds

despite the net saving of life, whereas executing murderers
does not, it must be because murderers are thought
blameworthy whereas their loved ones are not and because
absent blameworthiness knowingly executing an innocent
16

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __. This is actually a
contradiction in terms. To say that knowingly executing the innocent is
“worse than outrageous” implies that it can’t be justified, but to say
that it is only “prima facie objectionable” only creates a presumption
that could conceivably be overcome, for example by a consequentialist
showing that intentionally executing the innocent would save even more
innocent lives. This contradiction demonstrates, I think, Sunstein’s
and Vermeule’s ambivalence over the issue of blameworthiness.
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person in order to deter murder is deemed immoral – for
example, because it violates the innocent person’s
fundamental right to life.17
Therefore, Sunstein and Vermeule assume that murderers
are morally blameworthy.

In this society that assumption

underlies criminal law in general and death penalty
jurisprudence in particular.18

Many criminal law doctrines

17

Given the virtual impossibility of employing capital punishment
without error, it is inevitable that some innocent people will be
executed. If these knowing executions are to be distinguished from
executing other innocent people such as murderer’s loved ones, it must
be because not to allow capital punishment at all due to the
inevitability of mistakes would condemn even more innocent people to
death by murders that could be deterred through the use of capital
punishment. As Sunstein and Vermeule put it: “a legal regime with
capital punishment predictably produces far fewer arbitrary and
irreversible deaths than a regime without capital punishment.” Id., at
__. That depends on the adequacy of the process of determining guilt
and the frequency of mistakes. Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the
evidence shows there to be substantial accuracy in inflicting capital
punishment. Id., at __ and note 94. On the other hand, many
commentators have argued that procedural safeguards in capital cases are
grossly inadequate. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000)(discussing the political incentives
of the capital punishment system to convict and the many serious errors
resulting from the inadequacy of the process – e.g., inadequate
representation of and resources available to capital defendants,
prosecutorial misconduct such as suppressing evidence favorable to
defendants, and overreliance on an overtaxed appeals process to correct
mistakes – and advocating a more conscientious effort to assure fair
trials in capital cases); Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in
Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265 (2001)(discussing evidence of frequent
errors in capital cases and recommending solutions). Personally, in
light of the racial and class bias that infects the capital-punishment
system and the society at large, see infra Part C, I seriously doubt
that its inadequacies can be fixed. Compare Kenneth Williams, The Death
Penalty: Can It Be Fixed? 51 CATH. L. REV. 1177 (2002)(arguing that,
except for war criminals and mass murderers, the death penalty should be
abolished because of the incurable racism that infects the system). If
not, then substantially increasing capital punishment is likely to
substantially increase the incidence of innocent executions, possibly to
the point of overwhelming any deterrent impact capital punishment may
have.
18
See, e,g., Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal
Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1383
(2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
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that excuse or mitigate the sanction for actions that would
otherwise be punishable or punished more severely – e.g.,
the defenses of insanity, self-defense, or duress – have
their roots in concerns over whether someone ought to be
deemed blameworthy under those circumstances.19
Yet at times Sunstein and Vermeule seem ambivalent
about blameworthiness.

Thus with regard to juvenile and

mentally-impaired murderers they say that “no a priori
argument either precludes or mandates extending capital
punishment to all such cases.”20

And if there is sufficient

evidence that executing 15-year-old murderers (or, we must
also assume, murderers of any age) would significantly deter
murder, then “[i]n our view, there is a strong argument that

Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329-32 (1985); Stephen
J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 Geo. L.J. 527 (1996).
19
Re insanity, see infra note 34. Re self-defense, see, e.g. Shlomit
Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced
Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 999-1000, 1027 (2005)(rejecting
traditional theories of self-defense based on a “lesser harmful results”
approach where “the aggressor alone is responsible for the situation and
hence the weight of his interests ought to be diminished,” or a “forced
choice” approach where the defender’s act is excused because he “lacks
real choice, and so his act is not fully voluntary” or is justified
because “the aggressor, as the one who forces the defender to choose
between his own life and the life of the aggressor, ought to be the one
who pays the price”; and advocating “a theory of forced consequences”
based on “the unjust threat posed by the aggressor.” Re duress, see,
e.g., John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV.
275, 277-78 (1999)(rejecting the “traditional Aristotelian” view of the
defense of duress as based on the involuntary and “essentially unfree”
nature of the act, as well as “moralized” theories that justify certain
voluntary acts on the basis of “contextualized normative judgments”; and
advocating a “utilitarian model” that excuses certain coerced acts due
to their “undeterrability”).
20
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
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states would then be morally obligated to extend capital
punishment to such cases.”21
That certainly follows from a consequentialist
perspective.

What is not clear is whether they view such

murderers as blameworthy, in contrast to the innocent people
it would be “worse than outrageous” to execute on
consequentialist grounds.

That the issue is controversial

is evidenced by the insanity defense as well as the Supreme
Court’s banning of the execution of the insane, the mentally
retarded and juveniles as cruel and unusual punishment, all
of which derive from a perceived (albeit debatable) lack of
blameworthiness.22
Note, however, that the existence of the insanity
defense, and banning the execution of the mentally impaired
and of juveniles, might well detract from the deterrent
impact of the death penalty.

If capital punishment deters

murder, it must be because potential murderers are aware of
the possibility.

But if they are also aware of the

possibility of escaping execution through an insanity
defense or because of their mental incapacity or age, then

21
22

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
See supra note 13.
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some might be willing to proceed; whereas, they might not
under a “you do the crime, you do the time” approach.23
Therefore, unless executing mentally-impaired or
juvenile murderers is morally objectionable for other
reasons, Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s consequentialist analysis
suggests that it may be morally obligatory to execute them
in the face of evidence of its deterrent effect.
however, there is little such evidence.

In fact,

None of the studies

purporting to show the deterrent effect of capital
punishment controlled for the age or mental state of the
offender, and one cannot assume that juveniles and the
mentally impaired will respond to capital punishment in the
same way as “normal” adults.24

Therefore, the only way to

23

In banning the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins, supra
note 13, at 320, and of juveniles under 18 in Roper, supra note 13, at
1196, in addition to the moral objections the Supreme Court raised to
their execution per diminished culpability, it also questioned whether
they are susceptible to deterrence due to their impairments and
immaturity. In both instances the Court was speculating, as Sunstein
and Vermeule note with regard to Roper, Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note
3, at __, and it could be that executing them deters murders by other
juveniles and mentally-impaired persons. But that is not a sufficient
reason for executing them, if there are moral objections to doing so.
Beating a three year old child might well be an effective way to control
her behavior, but that does not make it right.
24
Between 1976 and 1993, the homicide offending rate for those between
14-17 years of age almost tripled from 11.4 to 31.3 per 100,000
population. Between 1993 and 2002, the rate declined rapidly to 9.0,
somewhat less than the 1976 rate. During that period the overall
homicide rate, which between the early 1970s and mid 1990s was roughly
twice what it had been in the prior 20 years, declined for all age
groups but by far the most for those between 14-17. Fox & Zawitz, supra
note 5. What accounts for this decline? Following the Supreme Court’s
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 after a four year moratorium,
executions, of which there were a total of only 885 between 1977 and
2003, began to rise in the mid-1980s from 21 in 1984 to a peak of 98 in
1999 followed by a drop to 65 in 2003. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5,
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tell whether executing juveniles and the mentally impaired
deters murder is to change the law and experiment on them.25
Although a consequentialist approach to the problem
would seem to recommend such experimentation, at times
Sunstein and Vermeule seem uncomfortable with that, stemming
seemingly from concerns over blameworthiness.

Thus, one of

their arguments against executing the innocent or using
torture in order to deter murder is as follows:
[I]t is not clear how policymakers could have reliable
evidence about the deterrent effects of conviction of
the innocent, torture or other disturbing practices
without first experimenting on hapless victims; and the
necessary experimentation might well be impermissible on
moral grounds ex ante, even if the policies themselves
at 10. Conceivably, the decline in the murder rate is attributable to
the resumption of and increase in executions. But the decline was
greatest among those under 18, who were the least likely to be executed.
Why so? Conceivably because of the fear that the death penalty might be
practiced more frequently against them as well. But then in that case
it might not be necessary to execute them in order to deter murder, so
long at least as the possibility of execution remains open; unless, on
the other hand, the failure to extend the death penalty to them over a
period of time dissipates the fear. If so, now that the Supreme Court
has banned the execution of juveniles, one might expect the juvenile
murder rate to rise again. If it doesn’t, then one may have to conclude
that something other than a resumption of capital punishment produced
the recent decline in the juvenile murder rate, thereby undermining the
deterrence hypothesis. If it does, then the only way to tell whether
executing juveniles deters murder will be to change the law and begin
executing them in sufficient numbers to study the impact.
25
That is certainly true with regard to juveniles. Only 22 juveniles
under 18, 13 of whom were in Texas, were executed between 1976 and the
Supreme Court’s banning of their execution in 2005. Death Penalty
Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid=27&did=203#execsus. That clearly seems an insufficient
sample to study the deterrent impact of executing them. I don’t know
what data is available with regard to the mentally impaired who were
executed prior to the bans on executing the insane in 1986 and the
mentally retarded in 2002. In any event, accurately evaluating the
deterrent impact of executing the mentally impaired on other mentally
impaired people would seem quite hard to do, since the size of the
target group (other mentally impaired people) on which the extent of the
deterrence depends is highly uncertain.
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would be permissible given certain experimental findings
ex post. Capital punishment, however, is already the
status quo in most states, and policymakers already have
many decades’ worth of reliable data about its deterrent
effects.26
But not much, if any, reliable data with regard to juveniles
and the mentally impaired.

Would experimenting on them in

order to gather the data make them “hapless victims”,
especially if it should turn out that executing them has no
deterrent effect?

The fact that they did the deed is not

enough to answer no, because that begs the very question at
issue of whether juveniles and the mentally impaired are
sufficiently blameworthy for the murders they commit to
justify executing them.

If not, then executing them is a

type of victimization.
In objecting to the execution of innocent people and
other disturbing practices, Sunstein and Vermeule show that
they are not pure consequentialists.

Consequently, I don’t

think they can complete their case for the sometimes moral
obligation of society to practice capital punishment without
more fully addressing non-consequential objections to
capital punishment as applied not only to the mentally
impaired and juveniles but also in general.

If it is

immoral to execute blameless people to deter murder, and if
at least some murderers are not morally blameworthy or for
26

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
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some reason have diminished blameworthiness, then how could
society be morally obligated to execute them?
Let’s begin by asking, in light of the fact that
society routinely and unavoidably makes life-life trade-offs
involving innocent people, why the issue of blameworthiness
is thought relevant at all to capital punishment.

Many

things society does or chooses not to do risk life and cause
premature death to some innocent and blameless people.

When

that is so, the argument that society should act so as to
maximize life unless there is good reason not to seems
strong.

Everything else being equal, not to prefer more

over less life would contravene the high value that all
moral philosophies place on human life.
The value of human life, though, entails more than mere
longevity, and at times the quality of life may enter the
equation.

For example, just as a terminally ill person

might choose to die rather than prolong a life of pain, so a
society might decide to limit the resources it expends to
keep terminally ill people alive and to devote them instead
to improving the society’s overall well-being in other ways
that may or may not involve life-life trade-offs.27

So long

27

See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS & LAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN
SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES? (2003)(on the importance of developing a fair
and democratic process for making decisions regarding the allocation of
resources for medical treatment in light of the inevitability of having
TO
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as that decision is made pursuant to a fair process, meaning
one in which all affected parties can fairly participate and
which fairly accounts for their interests, it would not seem
morally objectionable.

Such a decision would seem

permissible, for instance, in a society conforming to
Rawlsian principles of justice, under which there is no
absolute right to life but only the right to have one’s life
treated as of comparable value to everyone else’s life
through a fair decision-making process.28
So if there are situations when morality permits, and
perhaps requires, the sacrifice of innocent lives for the
benefit of the whole, why not with regard to capital
punishment if it could be shown that executing innocent or
otherwise blameless people would on balance save lives?

If

it is permissible at times to withhold treatment from a
terminally ill person or even to practice euthanasia,29 or
in a hostage-taking situation to kill some innocents in
order to save yet more,30 then why not to execute the
mentally impaired or juveniles if in fact that would
contribute to deterring murder?
to prioritize the uses of scarce resources and the unresolvable ethical
debates over their proper allocation).
28
See RAWLS, supra note 10, at 221-43 (discussing political justice and
the rule of law).
29
See, e.g., JOHN KEOWN, ED., EUTHANASIA EXAMINED (1995)(essays from a
variety of perspectives on various types of euthanasia, from the
withholding of life-saving treatment to active mercy killing of the
terminally ill, and whether with or without the request of the party).
30
See infra note 31.
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It seems to me that there is no logically correct way
to resolve these questions, and that ultimately a value
judgment is required in terms of what are deemed relevant
moral considerations.

The terminally ill analogy might be

distinguished from executing the mentally impaired or
juveniles on the ground that the terminally ill person has
little time to live in any event and is suffering great
pain, such that allowing the person to die or ending her
life is thought more humane than keeping her alive.

And the

hostage-taking situation might be distinguished on the
ground that there is no viable alternative,31 whereas there
are other potentially effective ways of deterring murder
that should be exhausted before resorting to the execution
of those society deems blameless.
But suppose it turns out that executing the mentally
impaired or juveniles really would deter certain types of
murder far more effectively than other measures; for
example, murders by other mentally impaired people and
juveniles who might be more likely to kill in the absence of
the possibility of facing execution.

Then on pure

31

For example, although it may not have been a classic hostage-taking
situation, the principle criticism of the government’s assault on the
Branch Dividians at Waco, in which numerous people including children
were killed, has been that there was still time to negotiate a solution.
See, e.g., DAVID B. KOPEL & PAUL H. BLACKMAN, NO MORE WACOS: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HOW TO FIX IT (1997) JAMES R. LEWIS, ED., FROM THE
ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO (1994); DICK J. REAVIS, THE ASHES OF WACO: AN
INVESTIGATION (1995).
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consequentialist grounds executing them would be permissible
or per Sunstein and Vermeule even obligatory.

If that seems

objectionable it must be – and this is the crux of the moral
debate – that for some reason it would be inhumane to
execute them even for the overall benefit of society, which
is simply another way of saying that they are not
sufficiently blameworthy for the murders they commit to
warrant executing them.
This is an example of a familiar objection to
utilitarianism as a philosophy, namely, that it allows
individuals to be used for society’s benefit in ways that
violate human dignity.32

For example, if human dignity

entails the right to be free, and if people operating behind
a veil of ignorance would not under any conditions agree to
subject themselves to slavery, then to an adherent of a
Rawlsian theory of justice slavery is morally wrong even if

32

See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism and Aiding Others, in WILLIAMS
& MILLER, supra note 7, at 225, 239 (arguing that utilitarianism would
justify forced organ donation at the cost of the donor’s life in order
to save two other persons’ lives, and that the example shows
utilitarianism’s insufficient sensitivity to the rights of individuals
and its preparedness to use people “in whatever way will maximize
overall utility”). Compare Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 59-60 (rejecting
the moral monstrosity claim by excluding anti-social preferences and
employing a rule-utilitarian approach that recognizes “the importance of
social institutions which establish a network of moral rights and of
moral obligations... that... must not be infringed upon on grounds of
immediate social utility”). Harsanyi’s move is tantamount to
incorporating into the utilitarian decision-making process moral
constraints that trump what a social utility analysis would otherwise
require, and akin to Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s reluctance to support
executing the innocent in order to save yet more innocent lives.
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it does benefit society as a whole.33

In short, in the

interest of protecting individual rights justice may require
at times that society forego that which benefits society as
a whole.

Before proceeding to execute the mentally impaired

or juveniles, or anyone for that matter, fairness requires a
fair assessment of such moral considerations.
Blameworthiness, as noted, is central to the
jurisprudence of criminal law.

And the determination of

blameworthiness depends on moral considerations that at
times may trump a consequentialist or utilitarian
calculation of society’s overall welfare.

The two

considerations I want to address here are the state of mind
of mentally-impaired and juvenile murderers and society’s
contribution to those murders.
A principal argument that has been advanced against
executing the mentally impaired and juveniles below a
certain age is that they lack the mental capacity to be
deemed deserving of punishment or at least of execution.34

33

RAWLS, supra note 10, at 158-9, 248.
See supra note 13. As debates over what constitutes legal insanity
show, what mental capacity is required to hold someone blameworthy is
controversial. The prevailing approach in this society is that a person
must be incapable of understanding the difference between right and
wrong in order to avoid punishment on grounds of insanity. The
underlying assumption must be that absent that understanding people lack
the ability to choose to conform to society’s notions of right behavior,
and that absent that ability blameworthiness shouldn’t attach. On the
other hand, under the minority approach the insanity defense is
available to people who understand the difference between right and
wrong but who as a result of irresistible impulses or other reasons are

34
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The concern over mental capacity ultimately derives from a
commitment to the notion that human beings have free will,
meaning the capacity to make reasoned and rational choices,
and from the moral sentiment that executing people when that
capacity is lacking or highly impaired would violate human
dignity in much the same way as executing the innocent.
Whether humans actually have the capacity to make free
willed choices, or whether their sense of having free will
is an illusion and their choices are really determined
responses to biological and environmental stimuli, is a
long-standing debate that is probably unresolvable as a
scientific matter.

For example, the fact that different

people respond differently in similar situations, or that
particular people respond differently to similar situations
over time, could be seen as evidence of free-willed choice
or of nuances in the stimuli that produce determined
incapable of conforming their behavior thereto. But the assumption
underlying the prevailing approach must also be that absent the capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong people lack the
ability to choose to conform to society’s notions of right behavior, and
that absent that ability blameworthiness shouldn’t attach. If the
policy underlying the two insanity rules is the same, then how to
distinguish between them? Perhaps on the ground that it seems too easy
to manufacture a claim of, or too hard to determine, inability to
conform when someone knows the difference between right and wrong,
whereas a genuine incapacity to understand that difference is easier to
determine. On these points and the insanity defense generally, see,
e.g., ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); ROBERT F. SCHOOP,
AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY (1991); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An
Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of
Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371 (1986); Christopher Slobogin, An End to
Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86
VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000).
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responses.

Consequently, society’s only option is to

address the matter through the moral philosophies it adopts,
whether those philosophies themselves are a product of free
choice or are determined.35
My take on the matter is dialectical and pragmatic.
Dialectically speaking, human action is a process in which
free will and determinism are internally related to each
other, meaning that people’s choices are free-willed and
determined at the same time; meaning that people’s choices
are in response to and are highly conditioned though not
totally controlled by circumstance, and whether the freewilled or deterministic component of action is more
prominent or significant depends on the context.36

Thus an

35
See, e.g., DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME (2000)(noting the
centrality of the free will versus determinism conundrum to the issue of
blameworthiness, and attempting to transcend the dilemma through a form
of “moral realism” which asserts the existence of objective moral truths
that are knowable through intuition and reason and that warrant praise
or blame on the basis of “introspectively known powers of action and
restraint... subject to projection onto creatures of the same or similar
type,” at 47); EUGENE SCHLOSSBERGER, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSONS 6
(1992)(“[W]e are morally evaluable for those properties we instantiate
that show something about us as moral agents, that reveal, reflect, or
express our attitudes, beliefs, values, and so on. A person is
blameworthy insofar as the moral stance reflected in those moral beliefs
and values is incorrect... Autonomy, freedom, and the ability to do
otherwise are not prerequisites for moral responsibility.”)
36
See BERTELL OLLMAN, DANCE OF THE DIALECTIC 27 (2003)(“There are not some
elements that are related to the factor or event in question as
‘causes’... and others as ‘conditions’... Instead we find as internally
related parts of whatever is said to be the cause or determining agent
everything that is said to be a condition, and vice-versa.”). A similar
approach seems implicit in some theories of criminal law. Compare,
e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997)(on
the capacity or lack thereof to reason rationally in particular contexts
as a way to reconcile the free-will/determinism conundrum); Morse, supra
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unemployed and starving person would more likely opt to take
the risks associated with stealing food than someone with a
job and a full belly.

But since the starving person could

choose to starve to death rather than steal to survive, a
moral judgment must be made as to whether it is just to
punish him under those circumstances.
Pragmatically speaking, since it is impossible to tell
whether free will or determinism drives action, then both
are viable explanations and which explanation is adopted in
given instances only matters when the practical consequences
differ.37

Thus punishing or excusing the starving thief can

be justified under either explanation depending again on
one’s moral philosophy.

From a pure consequentialist

perspective, whether the thief or anybody else has free will
or not is irrelevant since punishing the thief may deter
thievery generally in either case, whether because people
freely choose or are simply conditioned to desist from crime
in order to avoid punishment.

The only question is whether

society as a whole is deemed better off in punishing that
type of theft.

From a retributive perspective, since it

note 15 (on the ability or lack thereof to exercise self-control in
context as a way to reconcile the free-will/determinism conundrum).
37
See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1907)(from Lecture Two: What Pragmatism
Means: “The pragmatic method is a method of settling metaphysical
disputes that otherwise might be interminable... The pragmatic method in
such cases is to try to interpret each action by tracing its respective
practical consequences... If no practical differences whatever can be
traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all
dispute is idle.”)
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presumes free will, if we say in light of an instinct to
survive that the starving thief lacks or has diminished free
will, then punishment might be thought unwarranted or at
least appropriately mitigated.

If, on the other hand, we

say the person has free will, then whether to punish him
requires a moral judgment balancing his interest in
remaining alive as against other people’s property
interests.38
So would it be inhumane to execute the mentally
impaired and juveniles, or are they sufficiently blameworthy
for the murders they commit to warrant executing them?

If

executing them seems objectionable, it is not because they
totally lack free will or are unresponsive to conditioning.
Except in the case of severely delusional people or infants,
that is probably not the case; and if executing the mentally
impaired and juveniles actually deterred murder the proof
would be in the pudding.
In the final analysis, therefore, society’s moral
judgment about when people lack the mental capacity to be
held criminally responsible for their acts or deserving of

38

Compare Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, in
WILLIAM C. HEFFERNAN & JOHN KLEINIG, EDS., FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 98, 99 (2000)(opining, while
noting the philosophical argument for indigence as a justification for
criminal acts, that such a defense is unlikely to be recognized since
that “would call into question the legitimacy of the general rules of
property in a society”).
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execution entails unavoidably debatable line drawing.
Mental competency is a question of degree.

There is no

clear-cut line on one side of which people are clearly
mentally competent and on the other side clearly not.

And

there is ample room for disagreement among people’s moral
sensibilities about the matter, as reflected for example in
debates over what the legal standard of insanity ought to be
and what the age limit ought to be for executing someone.39
Scientific analysis can help decide by shedding light
on how people’s mental processes actually function, although
there will often be disputes over the meaning and validity
of scientific findings and as in other areas where science
and law intersect a value judgment will ultimately be
required.40

And judicial wrangling over the

constitutionality of the death penalty may help by
39

See supra note 34, re the legal standard of insanity. See the debate
between the majority and dissent opinions in Roper, supra note 13, re
the appropriate age limit for execution.
40
See, e.g., Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate
Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J. LAW
ETHICS & PUB. POL. 157, 161-62 (2003)(“When it comes to morals, the key
insight to remember is that scientific research is about the possible,
not about the ethical or the good. As such, scientific evidence can
inform society whether something can, at this point in time, be done and
scientific judgment can predict whether it is probable something will be
done in the future, but science is inherently silent on the topic of
whether it should be done... In matters both practical and moral, it is
nearly impossible to navigate the arcane world of the newly possible
without some input from scientists themselves. Rationally considering
the direction public policy will take to best serve the interests of a
free and democratic society requires an assessment of what is, in fact,
possible now, what will be (to the best of our knowledge) likely in the
future and what risks are associated with this possibility. Such an
assessment can only be made by relying on the testimony of scientific
experts.”).
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contributing to society’s understanding of the moral issues,
although in the long run the political process is likely to
control the outcome.41

Consequently, the moral legitimacy

of society’s decision of whether to practice capital
punishment and against whom depends on the justness of the
decision-making process.

If that process is unfairly biased

in one way or another, then the decisions emanating from it
are morally illegitimate.
Unfair biases might consist of procedural defects such
as a political process structured in favor of or against a
particular group or class, or of social injustices that
impede people’s opportunity to participate equitably in
decision-making or are themselves to blame for causing
crime.

Without question this society (and many others) have

historically been biased against the mentally impaired,42

41

See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991)(arguing that courts are highly limited in their ability to
bring about meaningful social change due to a lack of sufficient
independence from other branches of government on whose support they
depend to implement their rulings, and that courts are most effective
when they follow rather than lead political reform).
42
See, e.g., BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE COUNTOURS OF PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 97-104, 13035 (1996)(surveying the evolution of psychiatric institutions in the
United States from the colonial period characterized as “often gruesome
and brutal”; to the first half of the 19th cenury when despite a small
scale “moral treatment movement” based on “principles of decency and
respect” most mentally disordered people remained untreated; to the
latter half of the 19th century when the moral reform movement
dissipated and which witnessed institutionalization in large-scale
psychiatric facilities where the mentally disordereds’ experiences “were
comparable to their experiences in colonial America”; to the first half
of the 20th century characterized, despite a more humane mental hygiene
movement that benefited a few, by a burgeoning institutionalization of
the mentally disabled in state hospitals that functioned as “holding
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and whether it is adequately and fairly responding to their
needs for appropriate treatment today seems highly
doubtful.43

Juveniles below a certain age are excluded from

the political process, and the assumption that parents and
other adults will adequately account for their interests may
not always be warranted.

That school-age children murder by

the tens of thousands is a sign that this society has
grossly failed to respond to their needs for appropriate
rearing.44
Under these conditions I would say that society is not
sufficiently just toward the mentally impaired or juveniles
as to justify executing them.

This is not to relieve them

of responsibility for their anti-social acts, but to limit
how society may in justice respond to anti-social acts for

tanks”; to the latter 20th century which gave rise to a
deinstitutionalization movement emphasizing outpatient treatment and
maintenance-based strategies, but which has been characterized by acute
housing problems and ineffective support services leading to a revolving
door pattern of periodic crises, commitment and release, and by the
increased incarceration of the mentally disabled in facilities which
lack professional and supportive care and where they are frequently
victimized).
43
Id. at 3, 13, 103 (characterizing the history and present-day legacy
of the treatment of the mentally disabled, despite periodic reform
movements, as “the politics of abandonment” and as based on “an implicit
and negative assumption about individuals who act differently from what
we determine to be acceptable or normal behavior”; and concluding that
“the failure of existing mental health law to adequately provide for the
needs of disordered citizens is immense”).
44
Almost 67,000 juveniles under 18 committed murder between 1976-2002,
supra note 15. On the society’s failure to respond to children’s needs,
see, e.g., ROBERT V. HECKEL & DAVID M. SHUMAKER, CHILDREN WHO MURDER: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2001)(identifying declining support systems for
young children per changes in family structure, lack of community
services, unresponsive schools and juvenile justice system as
contributing factors).
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which it too bears responsibility.

Society may and is

indeed obligated to limit the freedom of those whose conduct
shows they are likely to murder innocent people.

But there

is something perverse about society’s executing them for
crimes resulting from its dereliction of duty towards them.
More consistent with human dignity, when society is itself
at least partially to blame for murders committed by
juveniles and the mentally impaired, is for it to do what it
can to respond fairly to their needs so as to minimize their
anti-social behavior, to attempt through rehabilitation to
undo the harm it has done to those who commit crimes as a
by-product of society’s failings so that they can resume
normal lives, and to treat humanely those who must remain
confined because they have become irretrievably
incorrigible.
C.

Social Injustice as a Cause of Murder – Executing the
Disadvantaged and Oppressed
One countervailing consideration relating to capital

punishment that Sunstein and Vermeule do consider is the
question of whether sanctions for murder less drastic than
execution, for example life imprisonment, might better deter
murder.45

If so, then given the goal of preventing the

murder of innocent people, their analysis would counsel

45

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
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against capital punishment because life imprisonment would
preserve more life.

However, in light of evidence of the

apparent deterrent impact of capital punishment, they find
this common objection to capital punishment unavailing.46
There are, however, other means of deterring murder that
Sunstein and Vermeule either give short shrift to or do not
address at all, and whose availability is I believe fatal to
their case for capital punishment.
Conspicuously absent from Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s
argument is a contextual analysis of why the murder rate is
so high in the United States as compared with other
developed countries that do not practice capital
punishment.47

Suppose one concludes, as seems most likely,

that the explanation lies in the differing histories,
cultures and circumstances of those societies.

And suppose

one concludes, as would I, that the high murder rate here is
largely attributable to injustices in the structure and
operation of the society.

For example, it seems to me a

strong case could be made that the United States does not
now conform to Rawls’ second principle of justice, the
46

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
Between 1999-2001 the homicide rate in the United States was 3.5
times that in the European Union. Gordon Barclay & Cynthia Tavares,
International comparisons of criminal justice statistics, 2001 at 3 at
http://www.csdp.org/research/hosb1203pdf. During the 1990s it was 3
times that of Canada. At http://www.answers.com/topic/crime-in-canada.
None of these countries practice capital punishment. At
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/capital_punishment.
47
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difference principle, in that neither the requirement of
fair equality of opportunity nor of the organization of
society such that its social and economic inequalities
benefit the least advantaged are satisfied.48

While it may

be difficult to conclusively prove a link between those
injustices and murder – in the same way that factual
uncertainties complicate most any public issue - the fact
that the murder rate is so much higher among the
disadvantaged lends credence to such a conclusion.49
If that conclusion is correct, then it follows that but
for social injustice there would be less murder.

Indeed, I

am convinced that in a truly just society murder would be
very uncommon.

If so, then one way to deter murder would be

to reform society.

Admittedly, that may be a complex

process that requires time to complete.

But so would be

gathering and analyzing the (never conclusive) data to
establish the deterrent impact of capital punishment,

48

RAWLS, supra note 10, at 75-83.
See infra, note 63. For example, among those on death row at the end
of 2003, almost all of whom were male, 52% had not graduated high school
at the time of their arrest, 38% had a high school degree, and only 9%
had attended college. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5, at Table 5. As of
2000, by way of comparison, among the country’s male population 25 and
older (representing 60% of those on death row at the time of their
arrest) 20% had not graduated high school, 28% had a high school degree,
and 52% had attended college. Among the country’s male population 18-24
(representing 38% on death row), 29% had not graduated high school, 30%
had a high school degree, and 41% had attended college. U.S. Census
Bureau, Educational Attainment at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
SAFFPeople?_sse=on.
49
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designing a fair process for implementing it,50 and then
waiting for the deterrent impact to take effect.

And all

the time, energy and money spent on that process could be
devoted instead to reforming society, thereby speeding up
the impact that process would have in reducing murder.
Now suppose one believes that this society is morally
obligated to comply with Rawls’ theory of justice, and even
that Rawls’ principles of justice are implicit in the
society’s foundational moral principles as set forth in the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.51

If it

is reasonable to think that reforming society in accordance
with those principles would greatly reduce or eliminate
murder, then to opt instead for capital punishment might
well in the long run produce more innocent deaths than
reforming society.

If so, then the moral choice, even

pursuant to Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s consequentionalist
approach, must be to opt for societal reform.

50

See supra note 17, on the importance of and difficulties in designing
and implementing a fair process for capital punishment.
51
Compare Linda M. Keller, The American Rejection of Economic Rights as
Human Rights and the Declaration of Independence: Does the Pursuit of
Happiness Require Basic Economic Rights, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557,
560 (2003)(arguing that the government has “the duty to facilitate the
pursuit of happiness by providing minimum economic means,” including
basic economic rights now widely accepted in the international community
to such things as food, shelter, education, employment and health care);
CASS M. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004)(arguing that Franklin
Roosevelt’s so-called Second Bill of Rights, including the right to
education, a job, a decent home and adequate health care, merits the
status of the Declaration of Independence as a statement of society’s
most fundamental principles).
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Sunstein and Vermeule do mention societal reform as an
alternative to capital punishment:
Switching to a Swedish-style welfare state might (or
might not) reduce crime dramatically, but we will never
know because we will never try it. So too, increasing
job-training funds by several orders of magnitude might
result in many fewer murders, but such policies are
simply not in the cards. Capital punishment, by
contrast, is very much a live policy option...52
This acknowledges the possibility that societal reform
might reduce murder more than capital punishment might deter
it.

But it treats societal reform and capital punishment as

if they are otherwise equal policy choices, such that the
only task is to decide which is more politically doable.
Yet if society’s injustices have caused murder, and if
society can dramatically reduce murder by rectifying those
injustices, then that is the choice it is morally obligated
to make.

To opt for capital punishment under those

circumstances is an immoral choice because it would leave in
place the murders of innocent people that are caused by
social injustice and that capital punishment does not deter,
and would lead to the execution of people who would not have
committed murder had society instead reformed itself.
Political infeasibility is not a valid excuse for failing to
do that which morality requires.

52

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
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Sunstein and Vermeule suggest a possible response to
this argument: “(A) plausible inference is that whatever
steps states take to reduce homicide, capital punishment
will provide further deterrence.”53

In other words,

conceding that society is obligated to rectify its
injustices, the argument might be that so long as it
proceeds to do so it should also practice capital punishment
so as to further deter murder, at least until societal
reform reduces murder to a level that capital punishment is
no longer needed as a deterrent.

In fact, Sunstein and

Vermeule seem to believe that point will never be reached:
“Whatever states do, some level of homicide is
inevitable.”54

So even in a fully just society, they seem

to feel that capital punishment will be needed as a
deterrent and therefore be morally obligatory.
There are several objections to this line of argument.
First, since resources are always limited, practicing
capital punishment will divert resources that could be
devoted to societal reform, and thus may slow down the speed
at which societal reform could occur if society had the will
power to do what justice requires.

53
54

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
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Second, as a practical matter, society’s use of capital
punishment may deter more aggressive efforts to reform
society by distracting attention from societal injustices
and focusing instead on what might seem a quicker fix to the
problem.

Sunstein and Vermeule acknowledge this

possibility, but then discount it:
(P)erhaps capital punishment reduces the political
incentive to adopt other strategies, and if this were
so, the argument for capital punishment would surely be
weakened. But there is little reason to believe that
if capital punishment were abolished, there would be
significantly larger efforts to reduce violent crime
through education and training programs.55
Perhaps not, but society’s unwillingness to do what justice
requires cannot justify doing instead what justice condemns.
Moreover, I think it can strongly be argued, and indeed is
likely, that the emphasis in the current era on personal
responsibility as the solution to social ills (as, for
example, with welfare reform) has in fact diverted attention
from society’s contribution to those ills.56

And continuing

down that path yet further may only solidify the focus on

55

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.
Compare Dripps, supra note 18, at 390 (discussing the psychological
tendency in this society to “overassess individual responsibility and
underassess situational factors” in assessing blameworthiness); Susan L.
Thomas, ‘Ending Welfare as We Know It,’ or Farewell to the Rights of
Women on Welfare? A Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of the
Personal Responsibility Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 179, 202
(2001)(arguing that the Act violates women’s human rights and advocating
“a welfare law that enhances rather than diminishes the citizenship of
all single mothers in poverty who need governmental assistance to
survive”).

56
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personal responsibility and make efforts to reform society
even less likely.
Third, even acknowledging the likelihood of some amount
of murder in the just society, it is not necessarily the
case that capital punishment would operate as a deterrent in
that context.

Perhaps below some level of execution capital

punishment ceases to work as a deterrence.57

Perhaps the

murders that occur in a just society are of a type that
capital punishment cannot deter.

Once there, if it turns

out that capital punishment will deter the still residual
murder rate, then there is a consequentialist case for it.
But until we get there, society’s moral obligation is to do
all it can to reform itself as quickly as possible.
A possible objection to this line of reasoning is that
it extends far beyond the field of capital punishment to
many other areas of social life, and that if followed it
would lead to ridiculous results.

For example, if capital

punishment is immoral when society’s injustices cause
murder, could not the same be said of the criminal justice
system as a whole in light of the plausible argument that
57

In fact, two of the recent studies have found that low levels of
execution actually have the brutalizing effect of increasing the murder
rate. Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 1; Shepherd, Deterrence versus
Brutalization, supra note 1. The import of these findings is that
states choosing to practice capital punishment must be prepared to
execute larger enough numbers of people to make deterrence work, and
that continuing to execute people after the murder rate has been lowered
below a certain level either through the deterrent impact of capital
punishment or societal reform would be self-defeating.

40

crime in general, or at least certain types of crime, are a
by-product of social injustice.

Does this mean that it is

immoral to imprison people who commit crimes that would not
occur but for social injustice?58
For me the answer is that, having wronged both those
who as a by-product of social injustice commit crimes and
those who are its victims, society must now respond justly
to both in a balanced way.

Society is obligated to protect

the innocent, and toward that end may restrain those who for
whatever reason are unwilling to refrain from crime.
Society is also obligated as far as possible to attempt to
rehabilitate those whose crimes result from social
injustice, so as to enable them to regain the freedom that
human dignity demands.

Society may continue to confine

those who have become irretrievably incorrigible, but in
light of society’s contribution to the situation must accord
them humane treatment while confined.

Subject to these

constraints confinement may be used as an incidental means
of deterring others from crime, but society’s principal

58

See, e.g., Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivations?,
3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985)(advocating such a defense); WILLIAM C. HEFFERNAN &
JOHN KLEINIG, supra note 38 (essays pro and con on whether and the extent
to which poverty does and should excuse or mitigate punishment for
criminal behavior); Human Rights Coalition, Mission of the HRC at
www.hrcoalition.com (advocating the dismantling of the prison system in
favor of “a system of accountability that is truly based in the
community and focuses on healing, not punishing”).
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means of deterrence must be to begin to practice social
justice.59
Above all, having contributed to murder through social
injustice, society may not compound the problem through
practicing capital punishment in the name of deterrence.
Sometimes as a result of their immoral actions people and
societies put themselves in situations where even acts of
self-preservation become immoral.

If the United States

unjustly invades another country and finds its troops
surrounded by an enemy engaged in justifiable self-defense,
it is not justifiable to kill innocent people to save its
troops lives.

Those who commit murder in response to

society’s having treated them unjustly may not be entirely
innocent, but for society to execute them after helping
create the situation is perverse.
A second possible objection relates to the distinction
between individuals and society as a whole.

It is easier to

justify requiring someone who has wronged another to rectify
that wrong even at the cost of some personal suffering, than

59

Compare R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal
Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U.
L. REV. 459, 462 (1994)(arguing, as a result of the impact of negative
environmental conditions that impair the capacities on which moral
responsibility depends, that “the criminal law systematically punishes
substantial numbers of the most deprived who... cannot reasonably be
said to have moral responsibility for their charged conduct”; and, while
acknowledging the need to confine those who pose a continuing danger to
others, advocating the creation of the social conditions in which people
have the opportunity to develop those capacities).
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to justify society’s making innocent people suffer in order
to correct its past wrongs.

As between two individuals,

when one of the two must suffer as a consequence of some
immoral act on the part of one of them, then the argument
for imposing the suffering on the culpable party is strong.
But should society in correcting its past wrongs be entitled
to impose suffering on those alive today who did not
participate in perpetrating those past wrongs?
To a great extent the answer depends on one’s
perspective of society as more individualistic or communal
in nature and on one’s view of the nature of
intergenerational rights and responsibilities.

From an

individualistic perspective, to the extent that those alive
today benefit from the past wrongs of their antecedents,
then requiring them to suffer in order to rectify the
present effects of those wrongs is somewhat analogous to the
example in the prior paragraph.

As between innocent parties

who suffer today from society’s past wrongs and other
otherwise innocent parties who benefit today from those
wrongs, if one side must suffer then the moral choice would
seem to be the latter, at least as long as they are left no
worse off than if those wrongs had not occurred.

While such

an analysis helps justify (say) affirmative action and
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reparations,60 it won’t do when in the absence of capital
punishment innocent people may be murdered, including people
who themselves suffer from society’s past injustices.
So suppose society acknowledges that its past
injustices contribute to murder and is undertaking to reform
itself.

And suppose it is argued that practicing capital

punishment along with vigorous societal reform will in the
long run produce the least net loss of innocent life as a
result of murder, even if it delays somewhat the achievement
of a just society.

This seems to me to be the strongest

case for capital punishment on consequentialist grounds.
Rawls speaks to this point when he envisions the
possibility that in some contexts slavery might be justified
in order to “relieve even worse injustices,” and when it
constitutes “an advance on established institutions” and “in
time... will presumably be abandoned altogether.”61

His

example is an agreement among warring city-states to enslave
60

See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251
(2004)(advocating an atonement model of reparations centered on
restorative justice in which all have a civic duty to participate
irrespective of personal guilt and especially white Americans who
benefit from the lingering effects of slavery); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking
Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action
and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 686, 694-727 (2004)(advocating a
corrective justice model of reparations based on the collective
responsibility of past and present generations to correct the present
harms of historical racism); Dennis Klimchuck, Unjust Enrichment and
Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1257 (2004)(advocating an
unjust enrichment model of reparations and noting its applicability to
those who subsequently benefit from prior wrongs).
61
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 248.
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rather than kill captives.

On the other hand, since slavery

violates the fundamental right to liberty, it can never be
justified for the utilitarian reason that “the greater gains
to some outweigh the losses to others.”62

Analogously one

might argue, conceding capital punishment to be unjust in an
unjust society, that it may nevertheless be practiced in
order to prevent the worse injustice of allowing preventable
murders to continue while society is transitioning to a more
just state of affairs in which murder may be non-existent or
minimal and capital punishment no longer needed as a
deterrent.
I have two qualms with this reasoning, one principled
and the other pragmatic.

From a principled perspective,

Rawls does not discuss whether the hypothetical parties are
involved in a just or unjust war.

To me this is important.

Suppose one party has unjustly attacked another which is
justifiably defending itself.

Then I would say that as to

the attacking party the agreement to enslave rather than
kill captives is unjust, since its obligation is to stop the
unjust attack so that no one need be killed or enslaved.
But if the attacking party is unwilling to desist, then as
to the defending party the agreement is just because it is
the lesser of the two available evils.
62

So the capital

Id.
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punishment analogy breaks down, where society’s injustices
are contributing to murder, because there is no need to
choose between available evils when society has the
capacity, if not the will power, to engage in obligatory
reform.
From a pragmatic perspective my problem is that the
transitional argument for capital punishment is too
speculative, and could be used as a sophisticated way to
justify capital punishment while undertaking less than
vigorous societal reform.

That this society is grossly

unjust and that its injustices are largely responsible for
the murder rate is, from my vantage point, undeniable.

What

we don’t know, and can’t until we try, is how fast it is
possible to reform society and what the impact would be in
reducing murder.

Moreover, while in the absence of societal

reform it may be that capital punishment deters murder, it
does not necessarily follow that it would be an effective
deterrent if societal reform were vigorously undertaken.
Perhaps seeing the process of reform would deter people from
committing murder as or more effectively than capital
punishment.

If so, then practicing capital punishment would

be positively immoral on consequentialist grounds.

Since

the answers to these questions is so uncertain, the morally
appropriate stance is to oppose capital punishment until

46

vigorous societal reform is undertaken and only then to be
willing to consider its viability.
From a communal perspective there are times, as
Sunstein and Vermeule note, when society has no option but
to make life-life choices as among innocent parties.

In

fact, such choices are pervasive in social life and at some
level impact most everything society does.

Fighting a war

in order to save innocent lives, for example, will
inevitably cost innocent lives.

And activities undertaken

to produce life-sustaining goods will inevitably have side
effects that cost lives.

How does all this cut with regard

to capital punishment?
Foremost, for purposes of this essay, society cannot
justly make life-life decisions unless its decision-making
process is just.

In particular, a process that favors those

who stand to benefit from the decision would be unjust as to
those to be sacrificed for the common good.

For example,

drafting the working class to fight wars or locating
polluting industries in working class areas, while excusing
society’s elite from those risks, would be unjust if the
political process that produced those decisions were
controlled by that very elite.
As applied to capital punishment, both the victims and
perpetrators of murder in this society disproportionately
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come from its disadvantaged classes.63

And it is certainly

arguable that the political process is tilted in favor of
monied interests.64

And also arguable, in response to

public demands to address this society’s high murder rate,
that the monied elite would prefer capital punishment over
(say) equalizing educational opportunities by restructuring
a public-school finance system that greatly favors monied
interests or over equalizing employment and income
opportunities through measures that would redistribute
wealth.65

Indeed, from my perspective what has happened in

this country over the past generation, in response to a
burgeoning social reform movement emanating from the civil
rights and anti-Vietnam War struggles, is that society’s
elites have promoted fear of crime and punitive approaches

63

See supra, note 49. See also, Andrew Carsen, Poverty, Crime, and
Criminal Justice, in HEFFERNAN & KLEINIG, supra note 38, at 25 (discussing
studies of New York City that find a strong correlation between murder
rates and areas with high concentrations of poverty, unemployment, lack
of college education, and single parent families); JAMES F. SHORT, JR.,
POVERTY, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENT CRIME (1997)(documenting the
overconcentration of violent crime in high poverty areas and analyzing
the adverse environmental conditions associated with those areas that
contribute to crime).
64
See, e.g., JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); STEVE FRASER & GARY GERSTLE, EDS., RULING AMERICA: A
HISTORY OF WEALTH AND POWER IN A DEMOCRACY (2005); KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND
DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH (2002).
65
See, e.g., PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT (1989)(arguing for
and detailing a feasible program for guaranteeing a right to employment
for all in the United States, and noting how guaranteed-job proposals
have historically been thwarted by business interests despite public
support for it in principle); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
FINANCE, EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Helen F.
Ladd, Rosemary Chalk & Janet S. Hansen, eds., 1999)(a series of articles
on various aspects of school finance litigation and reform).
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to crime as a primary means of undermining reform movements
and preserving their privileged status.66
It is true that capital punishment entails life-life
trade-offs, and it may be that capital punishment saves
innocent lives.

But so would other less draconian means of

addressing crime, means that would move this society in a
more just direction and preserve life in other respects as
well, and there is no way to know with any assurance which
approach or combination of approaches will most effectively
protect life.

Under those conditions justice requires a

decision-making process in which all society’s members, and
in particular those classes that disproportionately suffer
from crime and punishment, have proportionate input into the
process.

And that does not exist today.

The foregoing analysis is particularly poignant as
applied to African Americans.67

The facts are that the

murder rate is much higher in the black than in the white
66

See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997)(how society’s elites manipulate fear of crime for
political advantage, leading to excessively punitive approaches to crime
prevention in inner-city areas and roll-backs of social welfare
programs); Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the
Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (1997)(how politicians and
the media exploit and overly exaggerate crime, leading to an
overemphasis on crime prevention through punishment and producing “a
distorted image of what is important and how social policy should be
developed”).
67
See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and
Capital Punishment in America, in BEDAU & CASSELL, supra note 12, at 76,
85 (arguing that “endemic racial bias issues provide a particularly
useful vehicle for demonstrating that the death penalty should be
abandoned in this country”).
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community,68 that most murders are intra-racial,69 and that
the death penalty is substantially less likely to be imposed
when the victim is black.70

Therefore, the implications of

a societal obligation to practice capital punishment is that
many more African Americans, and especially African-American
males,71 should be executed than at present.
Before proceeding to do so, morality requires that we
ask why the cited facts pertain.

To me the inescapable

explanation is that they are a by-product of this society’s
racist past and of its failure yet to rectify the injustices
68

Between 1976 and 2002, the homicide victimization rate per 100,000
population among whites ranged between 3.3-6.1, whereas among African
Americans it ranged between 20.4-39.3. Fox & Zawitz, supra note 5, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/vracetab.htm. Between 1976
and 2002, 51% of murder victims were white and 47% were black; of the
offenders 46% were white and 52% black. Id. at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm#vrace.
69
Between 1976 and 2002, 86% of white victims were murdered by other
whites and 94% of black victims were murdered by other African
Americans. Id.
70
See, e.g., John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMP. L.
STUD. 165, 166-7 (2004)(finding, based on capital convictions between
1977-1999, that African Americans are sentenced to death at lower rates
than whites, and that the death-sentence rate is highest in whitevictim/black-offender cases, next highest in white-victim/white-offender
cases, and lowest in black-victim/black-offender cases); Randall L.
Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1395-98 (1988)(discussing studies showing
that offenders are more likely to receive the death penalty when the
victim is white than black, including the famous Baldus study used in
McClesky that found that the chance of receiving the death penalty was
4.3 times greater when the victim was white than black). Extrapolating
from Blume et als. data, Sunstein and Vermeule find that the deathsentence rate is 4.2 times greater in white-on-white than in black-onblack murders. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __. (Note that
they also find the death-sentence rate to be by far the highest in
black-on-white murders, where the rate is 2.2 times greater than in
white-on-white murders, thus indicating a substantial prejudicial effect
against black offenders when the victim is white.)
71
The vast majority of murders are committed by males. Between 1976
and 2002, 89% of offenders were male and 11% were female. Fox & Zawitz,
supra note 7, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/gender.htm#osex.
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done to the black community.

The result of these injustices

is reflected in virtually every aspect of American life.
African Americans are grossly over represented on the
poverty and unemployment roles, on the average have far
lower family incomes and receive a far inferior education
than whites, are still subjected to substantial overt
discrimination in housing and employment, and are grossly
underrepresented in the political process.72

An astounding

one-third of African-American males under age 30 are either
incarcerated or on probation or parole.73

As many as 60% of

the thousands of African-American males likely to be
executed with increased use of capital punishment fall into
this age group.74

72

On these points, see Thomas Kleven, Brown’s Lesson: To Integrate or
Separate Is Not the Question, But How To Achieve a Non-Racist Society,
__ U. MD. L.J. OF RACE, REL., GEN. & CLASS __ (2005) .
73
This figure is extrapolated from the available data. In 2003 an
estimated 12% of black males in their 20s, and by extrapolation from the
gross numbers about another 1% under 20, were incarcerated. Paige M.
Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, “Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear
2003,” U.S. Department of Justice Statistics Bulletin, at 11 & Table 13,
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pjim03.pdf. Also in 2003 about 30%
of those under correctional supervision were incarcerated, while more
than twice as many (70%) were on probation (59%) or parole (11%). Of
the probationers 30% were black, of the parolees 41% were black, and
more than 80% of those on probation or parole were males. Lauren E.
Glaze & Seri Palla, “Probation and Parole in the United States, 2003,”
Tables 4, 7 & 8, U.S. Department of Justice Statistics Bulletin at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus03.pdf. If we assume a
comparable age breakdown of those on probation or parole as those
incarcerated, then an estimate of as many as 20%-24% of black males
under 30 on probation or parole in addition to the 13% incarcerated
seems in the ball park.
74
Between 1976 and 2002, there were a total of 275,998 black male
homicide offenders. Black males between the ages of 18-24 represented
41% of all these offenders, and black males aged 14-17 represented
another 12%, for a total of 53%. Fox & Zawitz, supra note 5, at
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The impact on the black community of crime and of
punitive approaches to dealing with crime has been
devastating and will continue to be so with increased use of
capital punishment.

Given the society’s racist heritage,

its paramount moral obligation to the black community is to
rectify the on-going injustices that contribute to such high
crime and murder rates there.

This is not to excuse murder.

But after creating the situation in the first place, for
society to resort to the death penalty and to execute
thousands of young, mostly male African Americans as a way
to deter murder in the black community is doubly racist and
smacks quite frankly of genocide.75

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/oarstab.htm. During that
period, black males over 25 represented 46% of black male offenders,
id., and more than half of all homicide offenders of all races aged 25
or above fell into the 25-34 age range. Id. at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/oagetab.htm. Assuming half
of the 25-34 aged offenders fell between 25-29, it seems reasonable to
presume that black males between 25-29 represented as many as 12% of all
black male offenders. This yields a total of at least 65% black male
offenders under 30; if those under 18 are excluded, the total is 53%.
Between 1977 and 2003, a total of 2,723 African Americans (representing
about 1% of the black male offenders between 1976 and 2002) received
death sentences, almost 99% of whom were males and about 62% of whom
were under 30. Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5, at 6, 7, 11. This yields
approximately 1,671 black males under 30 who received death sentences.
If in response to a push to increase capital punishment as a means of
deterrence the death sentence rate were to rise to 5%-10% of offenders,
it is not a stretch to project that many thousands of black males under
30 would be executed.
75
Given the racist history of this society and the uniqueness of the
African-American experience, it cannot be assumed that studies
purporting to show that in general capital punishment deters murder
apply as well to the black and white communities. Only one of the
recent studies controlled for race, and it did find a deterrent effect
for both white and black victims. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra
note 1. One study hardly seems enough to warrant executing thousands of
African Americans.
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Perhaps this explains, despite the far higher incidence
of murder in the black community, why support for capital
punishment there is far weaker than among whites.76

Even if

capital punishment deters murder in the black community in
the short run, the community might perceive it as unjust and
as distracting society’s attention from addressing societal
racism, thereby perpetuating the conditions that cause
murder in the black community and in the long run resulting
in more deaths from murder and execution combined than if
society did the right thing now.

In a society still divided

along race lines as a result of societal racism, and with
the impact of an increased use of the death penalty to be
highest in the black community, its view of capital
punishment should be respected and not lightly overridden.
D.

Conclusion

76

A 2003 Gallup poll found that 67% of whites favored and 29% opposed
the death penalty for murder, whereas for African Americans the figures
were 39% in favor and 54% opposed. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics Online at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t250.pdf. In
a 2001 Harris poll the figures were: 73% of whites in favor of the death
penalty and 22% opposed; 46% of African-Americans in favor and 43%
opposed. Sourcebook 2002, Table 2.46 at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/section2.pdf. Public opinion regarding capital
punishment has fluctuated over the years. Annual Gallup polls show
public support versus opposition to the death penalty at 68%/25% in
1953, declining to a low of 42%/47% in 1966, rising to a high of 80%/16%
in 1994, declining again to 65%/27% in 2001, and rising to 71%/26% in
2004. At http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/opinion.htm.
However, support for capital punishment is less when the question asked
is whether death or life imprisonment is the better penalty for murder.
In 1985 56% favored death and 34% life, rising to a high of 61% favoring
death and 29% life in 1997, and declining to 50% favoring death and 46%
life in 2004. Death Penalty Information Center at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=1029.
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Sunstein and Vermeule are well respected and
influential scholars, and Sunstein has established a
reputation as one of the academy’s leading liberal voices.
As such, their touting of capital punishment may have a
significant impact in lending support to efforts to expand
the use of capital punishment in this society.

As a result,

many more people could be executed, most will be young men,
most from disadvantaged circumstances, and a staggeringly
disproportionate number will be African American.

Those

facts should give us pause, because they strongly suggest
that something is wrong with the system and that extending
capital punishment will only perpetuate and worsen the
injustices of the society.
Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s argument is sophisticated and
erudite, but in my view it is overly abstract and fails to
take into account historical context and practical
consequences.

As such, it brings to mind a line from a Tom

Lehrer song of yesteryear:
cares where they come down?

“Once the rockets are up, who
That’s not my department says

Wernher von Braun.”77

77

“Wernher von Braun” in the album “That Was the Year That Was.”
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